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Abstract 
It is possible to obtain a large Bayes Factor (BF) favoring the null hypothesis when 
both the null and alternative hypotheses have low likelihoods, and there are other 
hypotheses being ignored that are much more strongly supported by the data.  As 
sample sizes become large it becomes increasingly probable that a strong BF favouring 
a point null against a conventional Bayesian vague alternative co-occurs with a BF 
favouring various specific alternatives against the null. For any BF threshold q and 
sample mean X , there is a value n such that sample sizes larger than n guarantee that  
although the BF comparing H0 against a conventional (vague) alternative exceeds q, 
nevertheless for some range of hypothetical μ, a BF comparing H0 against μ in that 
range falls below 1/q.  This paper discusses the conditions under which this conundrum 
occurs and investigates methods for resolving it.  
 
One attraction of Bayesian statistical methods for researchers is the belief that, unlike the 
p-value in frequentist null-hypothesis tests, a large Bayes factor (BF) in favour of the null 
hypothesis and against its alternative is strong evidence for the null hypothesis (Gallistel, 
2009; Masson, 2011). While well-informed users of Bayesian statistics may be aware that 
there is more to it than this, it seems that many users may not be.  Unfortunately, especially in 
large-sample research with small effects, this belief can be outright misleading.  With 
increasing sample size, a substantial BF favouring the null hypothesis against a conventional 
vague alternative will increasingly co-occur with substantial BFs favouring a range of other 
alternatives against the null hypothesis.  Thus, depending on the choice of alternative, Bayes 
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factors may sharply contradict each other regarding the evidentiary status of the null 
hypothesis. I provide a guide to the conditions under which relying on the Bayes factor to 
assess the null can mislead researchers and research consumers, and develop practical 
suggestions for researchers.  
Collectively, Bayesians provide diverse advice on how to deal with point null hypotheses 
for continuous parameters. Some advocate using the Bayes factor, B01, comparing a null 
hypothesis H0 against its complement H1 as evidence for or against the null (Dienes, 2014; 
Konijn, et al. 2015; Rouder, et al. 2018; Wagenmakers, 2007). The Jeffreys table (Jeffreys, 
1961) linking adjectives such as "substantial" and "strong" with ranges of BFs has been 
popular in this connection. Other Bayesians do not endorse BFs for continuous 
parameters8,9,10 (Gelman, ete al. 2004; Lynch, 2007; Liu & Aitkin, 2008), with some 
recommending using credible intervals instead for making decisions about the null 
(Kruschke, 2011; Bolstad & Curran, 2016). Still others have pointed out that the Bayes factor 
and credible interval provide different criteria for assessing the null (Rouder, et al. 2018), 
along similar lines to the classic Lindley paper highlighting situations where a strong BF 
favouring the null co-occurs with a frequentist significance test rejecting it (Lindley, 1957). 
Those in this last camp recommend not using credible intervals to decide whether or not to 
reject the null.   
Setting aside the use of credible intervals, it is easy to forget that the Bayes factor tells us 
how more or less likely one hypothesis is than another hypothesis, but does not inform us 
about the absolute likelihoods of either hypothesis.  Thus, it is possible to obtain a large BF 
when both the null and alternative hypotheses have low likelihoods, and there are other 
hypotheses being ignored that are much more strongly supported by the data.  
We shall see that this is what can happen to a pointwise H0 and vague H1 under certain 
conditions as sample sizes become large. As sample sizes become large it becomes 
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increasingly probable that a strong BF favouring H0 against a conventional Bayesian vague 
H1 co-occurs with a BF favouring various specific alternatives against H0.  Thus, we may 
simultaneously find strong support for and against the null from the same data.  I will call 
these co-occurrences "Lindley cases", after the so-called Lindley (1957) "paradox". 
Lindley cases are most likely to occur when there are small effects and large samples. For 
a simple example, consider a two-outcome process producing E or ~E on every trial, and let θ 
denote the proportion of trials yielding E. Let us assume that θ is a binomial variable, setting 
H0 is  1 2θ = ,  H1 is  1 2θ ≠ ,  and assigning prior probabilities ( ) ( )0 1H H 1 2π π= = .  
Suppose we observe n trials and k occurrences of E. The likelihood of these data given H0 is 
( )0| H 0.5 0.5 ,k n k
n
P k n
k
− =  
 
 (1) 
the likelihood of the data given H1 is  
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
0
| H 1 1 1 ,n kk
n
P k n d n
k
θ θ θ−
 
= − = + 
 
∫  (2) 
and the Bayes factor for H0 against H1 is  
( ) ( ) ( )01 0 1| H | H 1 0.5 .n
n
B P k n P k n n
k
 
= = +  
 
 (3) 
For example, if n = 985 and k = 524 (so the sample proportion is 0.532) then B01 = 3.344, 
which in the Jeffreys table lands in the "substantial" range, 3-10, favouring H0.  However, if 
we examine Bayes factors, ( )0, ,B xθ θ , comparing certain point-valued alternatives against 
the null in the neighbourhood from 0.5 to 2*(524/985) – 0.5 = 0.564, we observe that these 
( )0, ,B xθ θ  > 1.  Moreover, for hypothetical 0.51042 0.55349θ< < , ( )0, ,B xθ θ  > 3, i.e., a 
Bayes factor greater than 3 against the null. This is a Lindley case. It occurs because both 
likelihoods for H0 and H1 are relatively small: ( )0| HP k n = 0.003399 and ( )1| HP k n = 
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0.00101, whereas likelihoods in the neighbourhood from 0.5 to 0.564 are higher than either of 
these. 
Introducing another example, we will now focus on scenarios in which we take a sample 
of size n from a normal distribution N (μ, σ2) population with known variance σ2, testing 
whether or not the null hypothesis H0 : μ = θ on the mean holds (against the alternative H1 : μ 
≠ θ). Without loss of generality, we shall set σ2 = 1 and we also set θ = 0.  The Bayesian 
framework requires specifying what is meant by H1, and for this we will examine more than 
one version.  The first of these is Robert's (2014) Bayes factor for the null against the 
alternative when σ2 = 1: 
( )
2 2
, 1exp
2 2
n XR X n n
n
 
= + − + 
 (4) 
We can readily confirm the claim by Robert that this equation yields 
(1.96 16,818 ,16,818) 19R ≈ in favour of the null. This reproduces the figures from 
Lindley's (1957) example, where he shows that a t-value of 1.96, sufficient for frequentists to 
reject the null at α = .05, also yields a BF of 19 favouring the null.  A bit of algebra reveals 
that to achieve a desired Robert BF of q we require 
( 1)(log( 1) 2 log( ))n n q
X
n
+ + −
=  (5) 
Two other versions of H1 considered in this paper are from the JZS-scaled and 
information-scaled Bayes factors generated by the Rouder et al. (2009) t-test. The Robert BF 
is handy for its tractability, and the Rouder et al. BFs are included here mainly for the 
purpose of demonstrating the fact that our results generalize to some popular null-hypothesis 
BFs.  
We now move to examining the behaviour of the Bayes factor when the null is compared 
against a point-valued alternative. A pointwise comparison between two alternatives gives a 
BF of 
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( ) ( )2 21 2 2 1, , , exp ( ) ( ) 2B X n n X Xµ µ µ µ = − − −   (6) 
The log of this is linear in n and the rate of change in n is positive when 2 1 X Xµ µ>− −
and negative when 2 1 X Xµ µ<− − .  Setting 1 0,µ = to achieve 
( )( ) ( )log 0, , , logB X n qµ = , again straightforward algebra gives two solutions: 
( )2 2 lognX q
X
n
µ
−
= ±  (7) 
Given 0X > , say, for any µ such that 0 < µ < 2X , ( )0, , ,B X nµ  > 1. By contrast, for any µ 
< 0 or > 2X , ( )0, , ,B X nµ  < 1.  Given any criterial threshold, q, from equation (7) we can 
find the sets of µ satisfying ( )0, , ,B X nµ  < 1/q and ( )0, , ,B X nµ  > q.  Moreover, we can use 
equation (5) to find X to input into equation (7) such that ( ),R X n q≥ .  We now have the 
wherewithal to ascertain the conditions under which Lindley cases occur (i.e., combinations 
of q, n, and X where ( )0, , ,B X nµ  > q and ( ),R X n q≥ ).  We will focus on large samples, 
because the impact of large samples seems to have been under-explored. 
Bayes Factor Example 
Suppose n = 5,000, and our BF threshold is q = 3. Then from equation (2) we have
0.035557X = .   Suppose also that our BF threshold for q is 3. Inputting n = 5000, q = 3 and 
0.035557X = into equation (7) yields lower and upper bounds [ ]0.0068368,0.0642769µ ∈ . 
That is, ( )0, , ,B X nµ  > 3 against the null when when 0.0068368 < µ < 0.0642769 .  Figure 
1 displays a graph of ( )( )log 0, , ,B X nµ  as a function of µ, with two horizontal lines 
demarcating log(3) and log(1/3). The vertical lines mark out the two pairs of bounds that have 
just been derived. 
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Figure 1. Log of Bayes Factor as a function of µ 
In this example, we have seen that under a set of conditions for which the Robert (2014) 
BF ( ),R X n = 3 in favour of the null hypothesis, there is a neighbourhood around X for 
which a comparison between the null and every alternative value of µ in this neighbourhood 
yields a BF greater than 3 against the null.  How does the Rouder et al. (2009) Bayesian t-test 
fare here?  The requirement that 0.035557X = to attain a BF threshold of 3 is equivalent to 
requiring a t-value of approximately 0.035557 5000 2.514t = = . Pursuing this with the JZS 
and scaled-information BFs from the Rouder test, it turns out that the t values required to 
obtain BFs > 3 are 2.467 for the JZS and 2.373 for the scaled-information tests. Thus, the 
required sample means are 2.467 5000 0.03489X = =  for the JZS and 
2.373 5000 0.03356X = = for the scaled-information tests. These yield similar results to 
the preceding outcome using the Robert BF, i.e., a neighbourhood around X for which a 
comparison between the null and every alternative value of µ yields a Bayes factor greater 
than 3 against the null.  These neighbourhoods are [0.00700, 0.06278] for the JSZ and 
[0.00735, 0.05977] for the information-scaled, both of which are fairly similar to the Robert-
BF based interval derived above.  
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How Do Lindley Cases Arise? 
A measure of evidence related to Bayes factors is the "evidence ratio" (Morey et al., 2016; 
Wagenmakers, et al. 2019), which can be written in two ways: 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
, .
p x p x
ER x
p p x
θ θ
θ
θ
= =  (8) 
The evidence-ratio compares the conditional probability of θ  in the posterior distribution 
with its probability in the prior.  If the same prior is used as the vague "alternative" against 
which to compute a Bayes factor for a point null, then the evidence-ratio at that point is the 
Bayes factor.  Evidence-ratios greater than 1 favor the hypothetical θ, and taking this idea one 
step farther yields the concept of a "support interval" (Wagenmakers, et al. 2019), the values 
of θ for which ER(θ, x) exceeds some criterial value q. We may also take the analogous step 
of declaring a "rejection region" as the collection of values of θ for which ER(θ, x) falls 
below the criterial value 1/q.  Thus, support and rejection regions for θ  are tantamount to 
regions displaying the point "nulls" with Bayes factors large or small enough to decide to 
retain or reject the "nulls".  
There also is a straightforward connection between  Bayes factors comparing a fixed point 
null with point-valued alternatives and the evidence-ratios for these alternatives.  In equation 
(8), the denominator of the right-most ratio is a marginal likelihood and therefore a constant 
that does not involve θ.  A BF that compares a point alternative θ against a point-null θ0 may 
be written as  
( ) ( )( )0 0
, , ,
p x
B x
p x
θ
θ θ
θ
=  (9) 
which therefore is proportional to the evidence-ratio for θ.  Their ratio is 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
0
0
0
,
, ,
, ,
p xER x
ER x
B x p x
θθ
θ
θ θ
= =  (10) 
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the evidence-ratio for θ0.  As mentioned above, if the prior involved in ER(θ, x) is the same 
as the vague alternative employed in a conventional point-null Bayes factor B01, then ER(θ0, 
x) = B01, regardless of the fact that ( )0 0, , 1.B xθ θ =  Equation (10) implies that setting a 
criterial threshold for ER(θ0, x) to determine a support region also sets a criterial threshold for 
( )0, ,B xθ θ , although the latter threshold is not known until the data have been collected.  The 
converse also holds.   
A source of utility in this connection is that both evidence-ratios and Bayes factors have 
clear and complementary betting interpretations. The evidence-ratio gives us the betting-odds 
ER(θ, x) on θ relative to the posterior distribution against the prior. The Bayes factor 
( )0, ,B xθ θ , on the other hand, gives the betting-odds on θ against θ0. Moreover, the 
relationship between ER(θ, x) and ( )0, ,B xθ θ provides an explanation for the Lindley-case 
syndrome.  
Returning to the binomial example earlier in this paper, recall that H0 is 0  1 2θ = and data 
are n = 985 and k = 524 so the sample proportion is 0.532.  Earlier we ascertained that B01 = 
3.344.  If we use the uniform prior then it also is the case that ER(θ0, x) = 3.344, and this is 
the evidence-ratio-Bayes-factor ratio in equation (10).  If we set a threshold-value for 
evidence-ratios of ER(θ, x) > 3 then the support region is [0.499, 0.565]. This interval 
includes θ0 = 1/2, and so we find that the data support the null.  Now, recall that for 
hypothetical 0.51042 0.55349θ< < , ( )0, ,B xθ θ > 3 against the null.  Thus, for θ in this 
interval the evidence ratios R(θ, x) > 3*3.344 = 10.032. Therefore, the Lindley-case 
syndrome arises because the θ in [0.51042, 0.55349] are much more strongly supported by 
the data than the null, θ0 = 1/2. 
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In our Gaussian example with n = 5000 and sample mean 0.035557, we found a 
( )0, , ,B X nµ  > 3 against the null for comparisons with any specific µ in [0.0068368, 
0.0642769].  In this example, ( )0 , 3ER xµ = when µ0 = 0.  The evidence-ratios for these 
interval limits therefore are 9. Again, the Lindley-case syndrome arises because the µ in 
[0.0068368, 0.0642769] are more strongly supported by the data than µ0 = 0.   
We now further examine the conditions under which Lindley cases occur. To begin, let us 
consider the range of µ values for which ( )0, , ,B X nµ  > q against the null at the same time 
as the Robert (2014) Bayes factor ( ),R X n q>  as a function of sample size. For any given X  
as n increases the ( ),0, ,B X nµ  > q range also will expand and ( ),R X n also will increase. 
We can see this by differentiating the second term on the right-hand side of equation (7), 
which gives  
( ) ( )
( )
2
3 2 2
2 log log
2log
nX q q
n
n n nX q
∂ =
−
∂
−
 (11) 
This is negative for log(q) < 0 and positive for log(q) > 0 when ( )2 2 lognX q> .  Thus, when 
( )0, , ,B X nµ  > q the limits grow further apart as n increases. Figure 2 illustrates this by 
comparing the ( )( )log 0, , ,B X nµ as a function of µ for n = 5,000 and 10,000. The shallower 
curve is for the smaller sample size. As in Figure 1, the horizontal lines demarcate log(3) and 
log(1/3). 
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Figure 2. Log of Bayes factor as a function of  for n = 5,000 and 10,000 
Given n and q, if ( ),R X n q= for some X then for X closer to 0 ( ),R X n q> .  However, 
( )0, , ,B X nµ  > q holds only for values of µ in the neighbourhood around X as explained 
earlier. For every X in the appropriate range, there is a minimum n required to satisfy 
( )0, , ,B X nµ  > q.  So a reasonable question is how the minimum n covaries with X
throughout this range.  For any benchmark sample size, nb, we can establish the subrange of
X in which the minimum required n is exceeded by the benchmark nb.  That will then give us 
the range of ( ),R X n for which, given n and q, it also is the case that ( )0, , ,B X nµ  > q for at 
least some values of µ around X .   
In the example, n = 5000 and q = 3, so inverting equation (5) gives 
( ) 0.02096292logX q n= = .  At that value of X , ( ), 23.5778R X n = , so this is the upper 
bound on 01RB when n = 5000 and q = 3 for which there is a neighbourhood of µ in which 
( )0, , ,B X nµ  > 3. The resulting subrange of X is [0.0209629, 0.035557], and these are the 
sample means for which ( )3 , 23.5778R X n≤ ≤ .  Thus, for a sample of 5000 obtaining a 
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Robert BF anywhere in the range ( )3 , 23.5778R X n≤ ≤  also implies that ( )0, , ,B X nµ  > 3 
for at least some values of µ around X , thereby constituting a Lindley case.   
Note that we obtain similar subranges of X for the Rouder et al. t-tests, with the same 
lower limit as the one just derived.   Recall that the upper limits of X for which the JSZ and 
scaled-information BFs exceed 3 are 0.03489 and 0.03356 respectively. At the lower limit of
0.0209629X = , the JSZ BF = 20.9126 and scaled-information BF = 16.6752.  Thus, for 
instance, given a sample of 5000 and JSZ BF between 3 and 20.9126, we know that it will be 
a Lindley case.  
Our next concerns are threefold.  First, how does this Lindley case region for ( ),R X n or 
the Rouder et al. t-test BFs behave as n increases?  Second, for any particular n, how likely is 
it that even when H0 is true, nonetheless Lindley cases will occur?  Third, how does that 
probability covary with n or q? 
Starting with the first concern, equation (11) tells us that as n increases the threshold X
will decrease. Substituting the inverted version of equation (11) into equation (4) gives this 
version of ( ),R X n : 
( ) ( )2log, 1exp 2 2
n q
R X n n
n
 
= + − + 
 (12) 
Differentiating it with respect to n yields 
( )
1 1
1
3/2
, ( 2 log( ) 1)
2( 1)
nR X n q n q
n n
−
+∂ − +
=
∂ +
 (13) 
which is positive for ( )2log 1n q> − . Therefore, although the threshold X declines with 
increasing n, the upper bound on ( ),R X n nevertheless increases.  
To address the second concern, let us return to our example. We have n = 5000 and q = 3, 
and inverting equation (5) gives ( ) 0.02096292logX q n= = .  As observed earlier, the 
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upper value of the appropriate range for ( ),R X n  is 0.035557X = .  Likewise there is a 
corresponding interval below 0, [- 0.035557 , - 0.0209629 ]. The standard error of the mean is 
1/√n, so it turns out that the areas under the normal curve for these two intervals sum to 
approximately 0.1263. Thus, the probability of simultaneously confirming and disconfirming 
H0 (i.e., observing a Lindley case) when H0 is true is 0.1263.  The same argument applies to 
the Rouder et al. t-tests. The areas of their intervals under the normal curve turn out to be 
0.1246 for the JZS and 0.1206 for the scaled-information tests. These are not negligible 
probabilities.  
Regarding the third concern, the probability of observing a Lindley case when H0 is true 
increases with n. For ( ),R X n , at n = 10,000 the probability is 0.130 and at n = 20,000 the 
probability is 0.133, and it is easy to show that it asymptotes at about 0.138. In general, the 
asymptote is ( )2 erfc log( )q− − .  On the other hand, we can see that it decreases as q 
increases (e.g., when q = 10 the asymptote is 0.032). Nevertheless, these findings suggest that 
for values of q regarded by many researchers as "substantial", the probability of Lindley 
cases is non-negligible even when H0 is true, and moreover it increases with sample size.  
Therefore, point nulls are not "provable" by Bayes factors.  Instead, if we want to find the 
"best bet" on θ then examining ( )0, ,B xθ θ  (or at least the full range of ER(θ, x)) makes more 
sense than restricting attention to ER(θ0, x) or the corresponding BF. 
Quandary at the Boundary 
Unfortunately, it is not difficult to show that with large samples support-rejection regions 
can become problematic in an additional way to Lindley cases.  Given a big enough sample, a 
value arbitrarily close to the point null may be "rejected" by support-interval logic while the 
point-null will be "supported" at the same criterial ratio.  For instance, given a sample size of 
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6,193 from a Bernoulli random variable, a sample proportion of 0.5156 "rejects" θ = 0.495 
and "supports" θ = 0.5 at a criterial evidence-ratio of q = 3.   
Returning to our scenario of a normal random variable, for simplicity let us assume a prior 
distribution for the mean of N(0,1) with a weight that counts it as 1 observation. Then the log 
of the evidence-ratio for an hypothetical µ is  
( ) ( )2 2, , ( ) log( ) 2L X n X n X nµ µ= − − + . (15) 
Given µ = 0, n, and a target log-ratio log(q), the sample mean required to achieve this target 
is  
( )( ) ( )log( ) 2 log 1X n q n= ± − − . (16) 
Note that this is very close to the sample mean identified in equation (5) for the target Robert 
BF (we are using a slightly different prior from his).  For example, given µ = 0, n = 5000, and 
target q = 3, the required sample mean is ± 0.035556.  
Symmetry permits us to deal with just the positive mean, so we do so from here on.  Given 
n, target q, and the positive version of the sample mean defined in equation (16), we may 
solve equation (15) to find the hypothetical means required for the target to be 1/q, which 
yields 
( ) ( ) ( )log( ) 2 log 2log ( 2) log
1 ( 1)
n q q n n n
n n n
µ
− − +
= ±
− −
. (17) 
The left-hand term is the sample mean from equation (16), so the pair of µ in this equation 
always straddles the sample mean in equation (16).  It also is clear that the right-hand term is 
larger than the left-hand term in equation (17), so the pair of µ also always straddles 0, our 
null-hypothesis value. Their difference is twice the right-hand term, and as n goes to infinity 
the right-hand term goes to 0.  Thus, the pair of µ may be made arbitrarily close to one 
another and therefore arbitrarily close to the null that they straddle.  That is, we may conclude 
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that for any criterial evidence-ratio level q, it is possible for a hypothetical µ0 to be supported 
at that level with another µ arbitrarily close to it that is rejected at the same level.  
Is a better approach available?  The nub of the difficulties revealed in this paper is the use 
of a point-valued null.  If we must make a decision for or against the null, we could a priori 
select a small range around the null, as in Kruschke's recommendation12 (Kruschke, 2011, 
2018) a "region of practical equivalence" (ROPE).  However, here we put it to a somewhat 
different use from his.  We may use evidence-ratios ER(θ, x) to determine support and 
rejection regions and ascertain whether these lie within the ROPE.  Considerations regarding 
the width and location of the ROPE are reviewed in Kruschke (2018).  
If a support region containing the null hypothesis θ0 also is entirely contained in a ROPE 
around the null hypothesis value θ0, then we may conclude in favor of the null.  In our 
Gaussian example, ( ), 3ER xµ ≥  when 0 < µ < 0.07111.  If prior to obtaining our data we had 
decided that -0.1 < µ < 0.1 constitutes our ROPE and our threshold is q = 3, then the resulting 
support region includes 0 and is contained by the interval [-0.1, 0.1], and we therefore could 
decide in favor of the null. If we want to be more cautious, we could also insist on additional 
conditions. For instance, we could require that the average ( ),ER xµ  within the ROPE 
exceed some threshold.  Conversely, if one of the rejection regions entirely contains the 
ROPE then we can reject the null.  
Conclusions 
It seems wise to take the problems raised here seriously.  They demonstrate that, 
depending on the nature of the alternative being compared to a point-valued null, it is 
possible for the same data to simultaneously constitute evidence for and against the null. To 
review the main findings in this paper: 
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1. For any BF threshold q and sample mean X , there is a value n such that sample sizes 
larger than n guarantee the occurrence of Lindley cases:  Although the BF comparing 
H0 against a conventional (vague) alternative exceeds q, nevertheless for some range 
of hypothetical μ, a BF comparing H0 against μ in that range falls below 1/q.  
2. For any such X and q, as n increases the BF < 1/q range for μ will expand and the 
conventional BF also will increase. The evidence for and against the null will become 
stronger.  
3. Although the threshold X moves closer to 0 with increasing n, the upper bound on the 
conventional BF for which Lindley cases occur nevertheless increases. 
4. For any value of q regarded by many researchers as "substantial", the probability of 
Lindley cases is non-negligible even when H0 is true, and increases with sample size. 
5. In a support interval setting, for any level of evidence-ratio, with increasing n it is 
possible for a point-null µ = 0 to be supported at that level with another µ arbitrarily 
close to it that is rejected at the same level.   
6. Bayes factors comparing a point null against point alternatives are proportional to 
evidence-ratios for the point alternatives. Therefore, any criterion for determining a 
support or rejection region will correspond to a decisional criterion for a Bayes factor 
comparing a point null with a point alternative, and vice-versa. 
The sample sizes used here for demonstrations are not outlandish, especially in this age of 
Big Data.  Researchers working with large data-sets are likely to encounter Lindley cases if 
they find small effects. The results presented here suggest that, on its own, a Bayes factor 
comparing a point-valued null to a vague alternative may be of little utility in assessing the 
degree of support for a pointwise null hypothesis, and its utility declines with increasing 
sample size.  They also indicate that using support and rejection regions for deciding whether 
to reject or confirm a point null can be problematic. Here, the nature of the prior will have an 
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effect. Introducing the use of a ROPE into this decision making process shows some promise, 
at least for avoiding Lindley cases and some other pitfalls of point-null testing.  
These suggestions are not the only ways that the problems raised here can be resolved, and 
it is beyond the scope of this paper to mount an exhaustive survey of potential resolutions.  
Instead, the main point of this paper has been the point out that there is an additional Achilles' 
heel in the Bayesian framework besides the choice of priors. Bayesian hypothesis testing also 
is vulnerable to attempting to "prove" a point-valued null, and that vulnerability becomes 
more apparent with larger samples.  
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